This book has footnotes, sources, charts, and pictures.
The United States Army exists to deter conflict through credible readiness and, when the nation commits its forces to war, to prevail in large-scale ground combat as a part of unified action. To win, the Army must be trained and organized to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to shape and dominate the operational environment while continuously consolidating gains. The largest and most complex Army organizations – divisions, corps, and theater armies – play a critical role in doing this. Each is structured to orchestrate and converge the capabilities of forces assigned them to defeat enemies in battle, consolidate gains, and set conditions to win in unified land operations. It’s critical to provide robust, large-scale combat operations training for commanders and senior staff. Enemies will not give us the luxury of preparation after a war begins.
Here, the United States Army Combined Arms Center has gathered a formidable group of scholars and leaders who have researched and commanded at theater army, corps, and division levels to share their hard-won wisdom and experience to support the continued professional learning among our leaders at these echelons. Pre-emptive thinking and planning now will help to ease the pressure of wartime demands and preserve national blood and treasure in the long run.
As the operational environment continues to evolve, so must the Army and the Joint Force. Peer and near peer adversaries are aggressively modernizing, adapting their methods of warfighting, and can now contest us in domains where we’ve enjoyed superiority for decades. Coupled with the speed of human interaction, rapidly evolving technological trends, and significant shifts in the geo-political landscape, large-scale land combat is more likely today, than it has been in a generation. Unlike the last 15 years of largely brigade-centric stability and counter-insurgency operations, the units of action essential to success in large scale ground combat are our divisions, corps and theater armies. This now requires a shift in not only our doctrine, but our culture, studies, and training. This body of work is a part of that shift.
Army University Press, 2017.
Chapter 1: The Army Division: The Cornerstone of the Army’s Fighting Force;
Chapter 2: Attack! Attack! Attack! MG Ryder and the 34th Infantry Division in Central Italy;
Chapter 3: The 4th Armored Division in the Encirclement of Nancy;
Chapter 4: Always Move Forward: The Blue Ridge Division’s Crossing of the Moselle River;
Chapter 5: The Siege of Fire Support Base Ripcord: The Failure of a Division’s Strategy July 1970;
Chapter 6: Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: The US Army in Bosnia;
Chapter 7: Operation Anaconda;
Chapter 8: The Operations Targeting and Effects Synchronization Process in Northern Iraq: A Case Study for a Division-Level Approach to Staff Organization, Leadership and Decision-Making;
Chapter 9: The History of the Corps in the US Army;
Chapter 10: Major General Lloyd R. Fredendall and II Corps at the Battle of Kasserine;
Chapter 11: Operation JUNCTION CITY – Finding, Fixing, and Finishing an Elusive Enemy in a Counterinsurgency Environment, Vietnam, 1967;
Chapter 12: Desert Jayhawk: Forming Teams and Getting in Place to Fight;
Chapter 13: V Corps Command Decisions;
Chapter 14: Economy of Force: Building a Headquarters for Afghanistan, 2003-2005;
Chapter 15: Echelons Above Reality: Armies, Army Groups, and Theater Armies/Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs)337;
Chapter 16: Omar Bradley and the Problem of Information in the Closing of the Falaise Pocket;
Chapter 17: Mission Command In Extremis: Lieutenant General Walton Walker’s “Stand or Die” Order;
Chapter 18: “Hard is not Hopeless:” Coalition Command and the Surge;
Chapter 19: Europe on Twenty-Five Dollars a Day;
Chapter 20: Pacific Pathways: Phase Zero Operations Under a New Four Star Command
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